Feminist scholars have documented with reference to multiple empirical contexts that feminist claims within nationalist movements are often side-lined, constructed as "inauthentic" and frequently discredited for imitating supposedly western notions of gender-based equality. Despite these problems, some feminist scholars have pointed to the positive aspects of nationalist movements, which frequently open up spaces for gender-based claims. Our research is based on the recognition that we cannot evaluate the fraught relationship in the abstract, but that we need to look at the specific historical and empirical contexts and articulations of nationalism and feminism. The specific case study we draw upon is the relationship between the Kurdish women's movement and the wider Kurdish political movement in Turkey. We are exploring the ways that the Kurdish movement in Turkey has politicised Kurdish women's rights activists, and examine how Kurdish women activists have reacted to patriarchal tendencies within the Kurdish movement.
Introduction
The fraught relationship between feminism and nationalism has been subject to much debate in both academic and activist circles, often resulting in, what Yuval-Davis (2003: 27) suitably called, a 'dialogue of the deaf'. Many feminist academics and activists have been categorical in judging nationalism to be antithetical to women's liberation (Enloe 1989; Parker and Yaeger 1992; McClintock 1996) . Western feminists, frequently in opposition to their own government's national and international policies, tend to view nationalism as a vehicle to further patriarchy.
Meanwhile, feminists located in the global south, particularly in contexts of anti-colonization and anti-occupation struggles, but also national liberation movements of ethnic and religious minorities, have pointed to the inextricable link between national and women's liberation. Kumari Jayawardena's classic Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World (1986) provided an important intervention in this debate. Through various historical and empirical case studies, the edited volume illustrated the various ways feminists were involved in dual struggles, fighting for women's rights and gender-based equality in the context of national liberation struggles.
More recent scholarship has moved away from generalised assertions about nationalism principally being good or bad for women and gender-based struggles, This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ pointing instead to variations within nationalist movements as well as the range of feminist positions in any given historical and empirical context (Cockburn 2000 (Cockburn , 2007 Sunseri 2000; Walby 2000; Herr 2003; Yuval-Davis 2003; Al-Ali & Pratt 2011; O'Keefe 2013; Gull 2014) . Adopting Anthony Smith's distinction between "ethnocentric" and "polycentric" nationalism (1983) , Ranjoo Seodu Herr, for example, distinguishes between justifiable and unjustifiable nationalisms. She contrasts the expansionist unjustifiable nationalism, built on essentialist notions of ethnic belonging and supremacy, with anti-essentialist pluralistic and, what she conceptualises as justifiable, forms of nationalism. Importantly, she stipulates that nationalist movements must pursue dual goals: self-determination, and the recognition and respect for the nation in the international arena as external goals; and internally, they are 'to secure an inner environment in which the members of the nation can enjoy equality amongst themselves and work with one another to promote collective prosperity' (Herr 2003:149) . Herr stresses that these two goals are not separate, but intimately connected. In her view, disagreements among the co-members "are normal and healthy elements of national life, and sincere efforts to democratize the political process are indispensable prerequisites for attaining the twin goals of nationalism (ibid)." Despite this ideal(ized) intersection of external and internal goals, feminist scholars have argued that, in reality, feminist claims within nationalist movements are often side-lined, constructed as "inauthentic" and frequently discredited for imitating supposedly western notions of gender-based equality. Even in armed liberation struggles, where women play active combatant roles, women tend to experience This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ backlashes, as case studies from Eritrea (Bernal 2001; Hale 2002) , Vietnam (Omar 2004) , Nicaragua (Omar 2004) , Palestine (Hasso 1998) , Sri Lanka (Alison 2003) and Algeria (Salhi 2010) illustrate. Omar, looking at the Vietnamese and Nicaraguan examples, argues that 'women, once active combatants in national revolutionary movements, are pushed aside because their elevated status during times of conflict does not conform to the traditional gender roles that consistently reemerge after nationalist wars ' (2004: 50) . Bernal in the context of the Eritrean armed liberation struggle states in relation to women ex-fighters: 'They fought side by side with men and killed enemy men. Their morality is suspect, their femininity is doubtful, and their ability to behave as obedient wives is questionable. Although national liberation has been achieved, the emancipation of women is at best incomplete ' (2001: 61) .
However, in the context of the Kurdish women's movement in Iraqi-Kurdistan, we can see that the tensions between feminism and nationalism cannot be resolved per se, but require an intersectional and in-depth empirical approach to grasp the full complexity and nuances of a specific context at a particular historical moment. These include the configuration of social and political forces that make up nationalist parties, as well as women's movements and the types of nationalism and feminism articulated by these different forces. The differences between women activists in Iraqi Kurdistan not only relate to debates over strategies to maximize women's rights but also to different notions of Kurdish nationalism, ranging from patriarchal to more egalitarian values (Al-Ali & Pratt 2011).
Moreover, the case of the Kurdish women's movement in Iraqi-Kurdistan also shows that we need to pay attention to the way that both nationalist and feminist movements This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ are not static but might transform over time responding to changing political economies. The shift from national liberation movements to institutionalised state-building is often detrimental to women's rights and frequently involves a shift towards more conservative gender norms and relations and the marginalization of women in the political process. Al-Ali & Pratt's findings resonate with Dhruvarajan &Vickers (2002: 251) , who make the point that women have made advances in some nationalist movements, particularly in their non-Western, anti-colonial form and typically as long as they were not modernising, state-building projects.
In our analysis of the specific case study we are interested in, namely the Kurdish women's movement in Turkey; we are also informed by Theresa O' Keefe's (2013) detailed and insightful analysis of republican feminism in Northern Ireland. She highlights the complex nature of the relationship between feminism and nationalism, arguing that nationalist movements can nurture feminism, albeit sometimes in a reactive manner. Her research shows that feminist nationalism is partly a response to the patriarchal norms found within nationalist movements: 'Feminism developed and gained strength precisely because of the attempts to marginalise and silence women. It was made meaningful, in part, because of nationalism's patriarchal tendencies, and any attempts to suppress feminism actually gave it oxygen ' (2013: 186) .
Research design and methodological considerations
In what follows, we are building on the recognition that we cannot discuss and evaluate the relationship between feminism and nationalism in the abstract, but that we need to look at the specific historical and empirical contexts and articulations of This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ nationalism and feminism. We are following feminist approaches (Al-Ali & Pratt 2009; Mohanty 2013 ) that stress the significance of intersecting configurations of inequality and marginalization. Using intersectionality as an analytical lens allows us to pay attention to multiple hierarchies of power in any given empirical context. In relation to our specific case study, we pay particular attention to the ways that the marginalization of women in the context of patriarchal power relations intersects with the marginalization of ethnic minorities, such as Kurds within Turkey, based on Turkish nationalism as well as political authoritarianism.
The specific case study we draw from is the relationship between the Kurdish women's movement and the wider Kurdish political movement in Turkey, referred to by many of our respondents as 'North Kurdistan' . While we are more sceptical than 4 O'Keefe about the long-term implications for feminism in relation to nationalist demands, we are interested in exploring the ways that the evolving Kurdish political movement in Turkey has politicised Kurdish women's rights activists, and how Kurdish women activists have reacted to patriarchal tendencies within the Kurdish political movement. We stipulate that Kurdish women activists have developed a gender awareness that has given rise to a strong Kurdish feminist movement, which, in turn, has been influencing the wider Kurdish political movement, crucially including a shift away from an emphasis on nationalism.
Given the significance of the Kurdish diaspora and the transnational character of Kurdish political mobilization, we decided to engage in a multi-sited qualitative (Knapp et al. 2016) . longer under the direct command of male guerrillas and were able to make their own decisions. This development gave women significant self-confidence and led to significant ideological, political, and social transformations (Çağlayan 2007, 2012) .
Several of our respondents pointed out that one of the co-founders of the PKK, Sakine Cansız, was a woman who was concerned with the specific struggles and inequalities facing Kurdish women from the beginning of her involvement. Ayla Akat, lawyer, former MP and long -time women's rights activist told us: 'Sakine Cansız was one of the people directly involved in the creation of different women's branches. Her personal experience of torture in a Turkish prison in the 1980s, and then of the Kurdish guerrilla movement, played an important role in her work for women's rights' (Tas 2016b) . However, women's involvement as 'sexless militants' (Çaha 2011: 438) and asexual political activists for the Kurdish nationalist cause, initially translated into a side-lining of gender-based forms of inequalities and discriminations.
As one of our respondents, a former PKK militant and now activist in Berlin, stated in July 2015, the PKK forbade any sexual contact among fighters who were to respect strict equality, but also ignored gender-specific concerns and needs.
The emergence of critical women's voices within the Kurdish political movement and the emergence of independent women's organizations was clearly also a consequence of patriarchal structures within Kurdish society and Kurdish political organizations (Çaha 2011; Diner & Toktas 2010) . Veteran political and feminist activist Gültan The side-lining of women's issues within wider revolutionary and nationalist movements has been documented widely in many different empirical contexts, as we mentioned above. Most of our respondents who had been involved in the movement for several decades concurred with Ki ş anak's assessment that the Kurdish political movement was initially replicating a global revolutionary tradition that viewed women and gender-related equality as secondary to its wider aims. This notion also resonates in Çaha's (2011) Liberated society in turn constitutes a democratic nation. Moreover, the need to reverse the role of man is of revolutionary importance (Öcalan 2013: 57) .
By the time of his arrest in 1999, Abdullah Öcalan would have witnessed the important contribution of Kurdish women to the Kurdish struggle but also their internal struggles within the movement. Since his period in solitary confinement on Imrali Island, Öcalan has published several writings in which he has engaged with the critique of patriarchy developed by the Kurdish women's movement (Öcalan 2011, 2013, 2015) . In his writings, he conceptualises the nation state not only as a "colony of capital" but also an extension of patriarchy. His model of democratic autonomy This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ without a state, which promotes the idea of decentralised self-government by councils and cooperatives, as well as confederalist models of co-existence and cooperation, puts gender equality at its centre (Öcalan 2011 ). Yet several of the other women we talked to emphasises that the achievements of the women's movement were not merely handed down through a shift in ideology by the male political leadership, however supportive, but had to be fought for over many years of hard struggles.
The 1990s, for example, were extremely tense and violent in terms of the conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish political movement, including the forcible evacuation of 3000 Kurdish villages and the displacement of anything between 1-4 million Kurds depending on the sources (Kurban 2012:7) . Not just Kurdish guerrillas, but thousands innocent male and female civilians were killed by government forces (Belge 2016) . Our respondents' recollections about this period are in line with Dryaz' assessment that women's involvement was encouraged by the Kurdish movement as a symbol of liberation and revolution but also as a symbol of Kurdish culture: "In parades and demonstrations they occupied the first rows by dressing up in the red, green and yellow colours which constitute a recognizable Kurdish symbol" (Dryaz 2011 ).
Ki ş anak and others remember the 1990s as a time when women organized and led numerous demonstrations; they were arrested in large numbers, tortured and even killed. It is during the 1990s that women become politicized on a large scale and learnt about their legal rights. Women's increased participation, both in armed struggle but also protests and demonstrations, in which they developed creative and innovative slogans, challenged not only the Turkish state, but also previously This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ accepted gender norms and roles within Kurdish society (Çağlayan 2007, 2012) .
Several women we talked to stressed that women's political participation in the 1990s, despite or possibly because of brutal state repression at the time, gave women more confidence in their political roles. However, some respondents also mentioned that they became more aware and conscious of the sexism and misogyny existent amongst Kurdish male political activists and politicians.
As mentioned earlier, the radical ideological shift from above, which, in our view, was as much inspired by the actual experiences and struggles of Kurdish women's rights activists as by outside political philosophers and revolutionaries, did not automatically translate into gender-based equality. Kurdish women continued to struggle within the wider political movement to gain recognition. Ki ş anak recalls the difficulties faced by women's rights activists within the movement:
It might be difficult to believe but when I look back at my own experience and story, the hardest time for me as a woman was not in prison. It was not my time at university or when I was working as a journalist. But it was the struggle we had to fight for in order to get a women's quota for MPs. During the time before the 2007 general election when we made our first important moves towards a quota, our male friends were happy about our hard work. We were organizing meetings and demonstrations, and were facing the police on a daily basis as we worked hard in our political and gender struggles. In the 2007 general election…, [w] e wanted an equal number of male and female MPs. The 40 per cent quota for women had been one of our party policies since 2002, but its implementation had been postponed to the next election. We did not want any further postponement. We wanted the policy to be put into practice. Our attempts created a big discussion within the Kurdish political movement. Women became more confident as co-chairs and men started to accept them as equals.
This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in
Zeynep Şahin-Mentucek (2016) has argued that the mobilisation strategies of the wider Kurdish political movement provided the conditions for Kurdish women to become more involved in formal party politics and to insist on the implementation of a gender quota. While we broadly agree with her analyses, we would like to add that Kurdish women's active struggle within the wider Kurdish political movement and the emergence of a powerful Kurdish women's movement also contributed to the success in their involvement in party politics. Moreover, our respondents emphasized that it was not simply a matter of a quota and co-chairing, but that the actual style and work of parliament changed. Women, for example, did not ask for permission This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ anymore to speak on important subjects such as the defence budget. Even after successful elections in 2007, Kurdish women activists had to struggle against ideas of tokenism and using women for symbolic effect.
Again, according to our respondents, the writings of Öcalan helped women to justify their demands for more equal representation and proper political participation. But the writings alone did not lead to these goals automatically but had to be fought for step by step by Kurdish women's rights activists. The male co-mayor of Diyarbakır, Firat Anli, told us in September 2015:
The main victory of Kurdish women was not just against the state stopping Kurds to be assimilated; it was against patriarchal men and society. Patriarchy and autocratic nation states have similar mind-sets, similar souls and similar aims. Both are based on inequality and the imposition of hegemony and one single identity. Both approaches are very selfish and do not want to share power and positions equally. The Kurdish women's movement has managed to transform Kurdish patriarchal men as well as the patriarchal mind set of the Turkish state.
The experiences of Ki ş anak, and others we talked to who have been active in the Kurdish political movement for many years, reveals that from the outset there were tensions within the Kurdish liberation movement linked to differing views about strategies and tactics but also different gendered positionalities, needs and experiences. It is also apparent that the nationalist Kurdish political movement gave rise to a growing and increasingly influential women's movement, which, in turn has transformed and shaped the wider political movement in parallel with the ideological shifts developed by Öcalan.
Beyond nationalism?
This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ While all activists we talked to agreed on the need for independent women's organizations and institutions, we noticed a range of positions and a continuum of views regarding the importance of an independent nation for Kurds. On one side of the continuum, many activists would emphasize that nationalism was bad for women, whether Turkish or Kurdish nationalism, and that a pursuit of radical democracy, justice and egalitarianism was a priority in their struggle for women's rights.
According to official PKK ideology, capitalism and the nation-state represent the dominant and exploitative male in its most institutionalized form. The Kurdish academic and activist Dilar Dirik puts it the following way (Maur et al. 2015: 27-8 
):
Many people think that a national cause -a national liberation movement or nationalismis incompatible with women's liberation. I agree, because nationalism has many patriarchal, feudal, primitive premises that in one way or another boil down to passing on the genes of the male bloodline and reproducing domination, to pass on from one generation to another what is perceived as a "nation." Add to that the extremely gendered assumptions that accompany nationalism, which affect family life, labor relations, the economy, knowledge, culture, and education, and it becomes evident that it is a very masculinized concept.
However, some of the Kurdish women activists whom we had conversations with were more ambiguous in their views and seem to hold on to the close relationship between national liberation and women's liberation. For example, this middle-aged veteran activist and former PKK militant, now based in Diyarbakır, told us in September 2015:
We are part of a nation whose identity has not been recognised for almost a century. The women of the Kurdish nation have also not existed, according to the dominant state structure.
Without the recognition of a national identity, it is not possible to focus on issues for Kurdish
This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ women. For that reason, when Kurdish women started our movement in the 1990s, the national cause was the first aim. The national cause came above everything. But after some time, we recognised that even our Kurdish male comrades, who were taking part in demonstrations with us, were also acting as representatives of authority. Small branches of the hegemonic state were actively oppressing women in every household, community and workplace. Then we decided that we needed to fight against two authorities: the state and masculine authority at the same time.
The co-mayor of Diyarbakır, Firat Anli also recognized that many Kurdish people want to put the aims and needs of Kurdish nationalism before gender-based equality and rights of minorities. He explained to us:
[S]ome of our members have been questioning whether it is our business to support modernist, leftist, or socialist ideology and the rights and needs of women and poor people. They want us to focus first on the national identity of Kurdistan. For them nationalist needs are the most important and should come before everything else. They believe this approach would help produce a Kurdish independent state. Then, after that, they suggest we could focus on other things, including gender equality. This strong nationalist ideology exists among many Kurds and the continuation of state violence helps this approach to gain power.
We found that within the diaspora there seemed to be more emphasis played on the importance of creating an independent state for Kurds as a pre-condition to achieve not only freedom from oppression but also gender-based equality. A Kurdish female activist and lawyer who used to be a former PKK militant, and is now based in Berlin positions between men and women are integral to the attempt to build a radically democratic, multi-cultural and egalitarian society in northern Syria (Maur et al. 2015; Knapp et al. 2016 ). While it is beyond the scope of this article to focus on the way that these ideas are articulated in the political and social organization of the cantons of Jazira , Kobanî , and Afrin, as well as the Shahba region in northern Syria, it is important to recognise that the so-called Rojava revolution and women's prominent role within it, is inspired and informed by the dynamic between Kurdish women's rights activists and the wider movement linked to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict and struggle. Beyond South-Eastern Turkey and northern Syria, these ideas and practises are also known and discussed amongst Kurdish women's rights activists in northern Iraq ('South Kurdistan') and North-western Iran ('East Kurdistan'). Within the Kurdish diaspora, especially in places like the UK and Germany with large numbers of political opposition activists, Kurdish women's rights organizations flourish and attempt to develop independently while also influencing the larger Kurdish diaspora organizations.
Recognizing the transnational reach and scope of Kurdish women's rights activism, the movement has attempted to create umbrella institutions to reflect the scale of Kurdish women's mobilization and need for independent spaces. Shortly before Akat and Ki ş anak, as well as some other women's activists of different generations, had the chance to travel abroad and meet with women's rights activists in regional and global fora, thereby recognizing the long trajectories of feminist struggles in many different parts of the world as well as the range of different feminisms. Yet, it became apparent that many of our respondents equate feminism with white western liberal feminism, as opposed to its Marxist, postcolonial or transnational feminist strands.
Although we are sceptical about the epistemological foundations and theoretical contributions of Jineolojî -based on our respondents' assertions about the centrality This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ also perceived as an important marker of difference and inequality. However, as became evident in some of our interviews, class and gender seem to be conflated at times, with women designated as a class in and of itself. Consequently, the struggle for gender equality is also perceived to be struggle against class inequalities.
Yet, unlike the republican feminism that grew out of the Irish republican movement as O'Keefe (2013) discusses in her work, the Kurdish feminist movement has not tackled issues linked to reproductive rights and sexuality. Given that women's roles as biological and symbolic reproducers of nation states and ethnic communities (Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1987 ) is key to nationalism in its various articulations, we speculate that Kurdish women's rights activists will not be able to radically transform Kurdish society outside, either the armed wing or the political cadres, unless they start to address issues linked to sexuality and morality. According to our respondents inside Turkey and in the diaspora, both Kurdish male and female fighters are tasked to be celibate during their struggle, and have to become sexless beings in order to live egalitarian lives. Meanwhile, reproduction and broader sexual relations within wider Kurdish society have not been challenged systematically.
Clearly, the bracketing of sexuality and reproductive rights out of the Kurdish women's rights struggle, and that of the wider political movement is a bargaining with conservative patriarchal gender norms and an attempt to not alienate prevailing notions of morality, honour and propriety. As Çağlayan (2012) demonstrates in her work, Öcalan's writings in the 1990s engages in a critique of "the traditional family", particularly in relation to women's honour ( namus ). By shifting away the focus from sexuality and romantic love to the protection and defence of the homeland, Öcalan not This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ only encouraged men to privilege the revolutionary liberation struggle over the control of women's bodies, he also removed the barriers for women to participate in the struggle (Çağlayan 2012:12) . However, this reconceptualization of namus was not only based on the idea that love and sexuality are dangerous distractions from the national struggle, it also led to new forms of control over both women's and men's The relationship is complicated by the fact that the Kurdish political movement is far more heterogeneous than often portrayed with a range of different positions and relationships to the PKK. For example, we found that the Kurdish women's rights activists we talked to had differing experiences of armed struggle. While some got politicized in the context of becoming female militants within the PKK, others become involved within the broader Kurdish legal and political movement, which, at the time of our research, was much less militarized and invested very differently in This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ finding a political solution to the conflict with the Turkish state. We also found that our respondents had very different relationships to the recent ideological shift developed in Öcalan's prison writings . While some women seemed to refer to the writings as a form of dogma, others appeared to use it to back their own positions, which had clearly developed as a result of long-term political struggle and experiences. This point is often overlooked in analysis, as the reference to Öcalan's writings is frequently mistaken as a straightforward dogmatic adherence, while our analysis points to a much more complex and diverse picture.
The specific case study of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey also provides further evidence that the relationship between feminism and nationalism cannot be assessed abstractly nor categorically, but needs to be looked at historically and in a specific empirical context. The broader context in Turkey and the region have significantly impacted on this complex and entangled relationship that has evolved over time. We could detect significant shifts in attitudes even during our 2 years period of fieldwork. At moments of lower scale conflict, spaces are clearly opening up for feminist demands and initiatives to promote gender-based justice and equality.
However, more acute and heightened violence and conflict, as it unfolded in Turkey after the elections of June 2015 and the failed coup of July 2016, provide more incentives for nationalist sentiments and activism, and often lead to the marginalization of gender-based claims.
Furthermore, an empirically-grounded analysis helps us to understand not only heterogeneous positions, but also internal contradictions and frequent gaps between official rhetoric and more private and individual views and opinions. The Kurdish This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ movement loosely linked to or inspired by the PKK has officially not only abandoned violent struggle but also its commitment to an independent nation state called Kurdistan and is favouring a non-ethnically based radical democracy and a confederal system within the borders of existing nation states (Maur et al. 2015; Knapp et al. 2016 ). However, in reality, nationalist sentiments are still strong and existent in a context where the Turkish government has engaged in the most brutal and ferocious crack down on the political and legal branch of the Kurdish political movement.
Given the extreme challenges posed by the Turkish state, much of the activism, campaigns and initiatives by Kurdish women's rights activists based in Turkey are directed towards the Turkish state despite their commitment to a transnational struggle for radical democracy and gender equality.
Regionally, Kurdish nationalism has been strengthened by the fact that Kurds, who are engaged in armed resistance against ISIS in northern Syria and Iraqi-Kurdistan, have also been under attack by the Turkish army. It is apparent that there exist contesting views about the idea of a Kurdish independent state, and these views are often only expressed in private as they differ from the official script.
We agree with O'Keefe (2013) that much of the literature that explores the relationship between nationalism and feminism focuses on the negative impact of nationalism on women, and fails to analyse carefully women's agency. Our article reveals the transformative processes within the Kurdish nationalist movement, which have led to the politicisation of women and the emergence of a feminist identity and a collectivity engaged in feminist action. Kurdish feminist nationalism in turn developed a critique of nationalism while the political leadership also distanced itself This is the accepted version of an article published by Wiley in Nations and Nationalism . Published version available from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/nana.12383/abstract Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25539/ from the nationalist trope. In that process, Kurdish feminist nationalism transformed into what one might coin a Kurdish transnational feminism. As we pointed out, this transformation has not been without tensions and contradictions. Notwithstanding the internal contradictions and the limitations we have pointed to, especially in relation to the lack of overtly critical engagement with the writing of Abdullah Öcalan, and not tackling issues of sexuality and morality, there is no doubt that Kurdish women's rights activists together with the wider Kurdish political movement have developed an impressive feminist critique and interventions in terms of the masculinised and patriarchal character of the nation state and patriarchal and authoritarian leadership.
